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Humean accounts of laws of nature maintain that the laws are certain sorts of
regularities in the particular matters of fact. For example, according to Lewis’s
Best System Account (“BSA”), the laws are the regularities of that systemati-
zation of the particular matters of fact which best balances the desiderata of
simplicity and strength.1 A common objection to Humean views like the BSA
is that they render the laws unable to play the explanatory role that is tradi-
tionally attributed to them in scientific practice, wherein the laws are routinely
used to explain the occurrences of natural phenomena. The worry, roughly, is
that if the laws are just regularities in the particular matters of fact, then they
cannot also explain the particular matters of fact, for that would seem to be
dangerously close to a circular explanation of the particular matters of fact by
themselves. As Maudlin puts it:
If the laws are nothing but generic features of the Humean Mosaic,
then there is a sense in which one cannot appeal to those very laws to
explain the particular features of the Mosaic itself: the laws are what
they are in virtue of the Mosaic rather than vice versa. (Maudlin
2007, p. 172)2
Recently there has been a renewed interest in this sort of argument against
Humeanism. In his (2012), Loewer defends Humeanism from the charge of
explanatory circularity, suggesting that the worry only arises if we fail to distin-
guish between scientific and metaphysical explanations: the laws scientifically
explain the particular matters of fact, but the particular matters of fact meta-
physically explain the laws (according to the Humean). Loewer thinks that
the fact that there are two different kinds of explanation here precludes any
worrying kind of circularity.
∗Thanks to Marc Lange and an anonymous referee for providing helpful comments and
advice.
1See Lewis (1973, 1986, 1994).
2Armstrong expresses a similar worry in his (1983, p. 102).
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Loewer’s proposal has received some intense scrutiny from the likes of Lange
(2013, 2018), Emery (forthcoming), and Shumener (2017), but ultimately I think
that Loewer is right: the differences between metaphysical and scientific expla-
nations are what saves the Humean. However, in order to see this, we have to
step back from the particulars of these debates and consider why scientists care
about explanatory considerations in the first place. Ultimately, my suggestion
will be that the aims of explanation—our motivations for seeking explanatory
theories—are very different in science than they are in metaphysics. Or at the
very least, Humeans should think so. And these different aims are going to
undercut any sort of systematic connection between scientific and metaphysical
explanations, thus rendering the charges of explanatory circularity unsuccessful.
In brief, the explanatory circularity objection against Humeanism succeeds only
if we assume that the aims of scientific and metaphysical explanation align in a
way that the Humean has good reasons to reject.
This paper proceeds as follows. In §2, I explicate the circularity objection
against Humeanism in more detail. Then in §3, I review a recent Humean theory
that, I will argue later, is particularly well positioned to avoid the circularity
objection. In §4, I consider the question of why scientists care about finding
theories that possess explanatory virtues. I will suggest that Humeans should
understand the explanatory virtues not, in the first instance, as a guide to truth,
but rather as ways of making our scientific theories more predictively useful. On
the basis of this discussion, in §5 I will argue that the Humean should conceive
of the aims of scientific and metaphysical explanation very differently, and I will
show how this undercuts the circularity worry. I conclude in §6.
2 The Circularity Problem for Humeanism
In its most basic form, the circularity problem for Humeanism can be stated
quite simply. Dating back to at least Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) Deductive
Nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation, philosophers have recognized
that the laws of nature can be used to explain their instances. If it is a law that
all F s are Gs, then we can explain why some particular F is G by appealing
to that law. More realistically, consider the Lorentz force law, which states
that a charged particle traversing a magnetic field will experience a “Lorentz
force” perpendicular to its direction of motion. Now suppose that we observe an
electron traversing a magnetic field, and as it does so, it curves off of its original
trajectory, indicating that it is experiencing a force. Call this event “e”. We
can explain why e occurred by appealing to the Lorentz force law: the electron
is a charged particle, and as it traverses the magnetic field, the Lorentz force
law states that it will experience a Lorentz force. The event e is thus both an
instance of, and explained by, the Lorentz force law.3
3Two clarifications. First, the claim is not that any fact “covered” by a law is explained
by it. For example, it would be incorrect to say that the Lorentz force law, together with
the strength of the magnetic field and the magnitude of the Lorentz force experienced by the
electron, explains why the electron has the charge that it does. (One of the main problems
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The problem for the Humean is that she conceives of the Lorentz force law
itself as essentially just the regularity that every time a charged particle enters
a magnetic field, it experiences a Lorentz force perpendicular to its direction of
motion.4 And if that is what the law amounts to, then part of what makes it
a law is the fact that e occurs. Thus it looks as though, on the Humean view,
e helps to explain why the Lorentz force law is a law, while at the same time
the Lorentz force law can be used to explain why e obtains. And this seems
problematic, as if e is helping to explain why e itself occurred.5
As I mentioned before, Loewer (2012) has suggested that this circularity
worry can be circumvented by noting that there are two different kinds of ex-
planation occurring here. On the one hand, the Lorentz force law scientifically
explains the occurrence of e, but on the other hand, e helps to metaphysically
explain the lawhood of the Lorentz force law. Loewer does not provide an in-
depth analysis of the differences between these kinds of explanation, but he
does think that they are significant enough to preclude the circularity worry.
Thus, Loewer would say that in our example, e is not helping to explain itself
in any univocal sense, because there are two very different kinds of explanation
at work.
However, Loewer’s suggestion has been challenged by Lange (2013), who
suggests that scientific and metaphysical explanations are linked by the following
transitivity principle:
TP: If X scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically explain] Y and Z
metaphysically explains [or helps to metaphysically explain] X, then Z
scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically explain] Y .6
Lange motivates TP with a number of compelling examples, many of which
have the same character. One such example (ibid., p. 257) is the expansion of a
balloon, which is scientifically explained by certain laws as well as the fact that
the balloon’s internal pressure is greater than the external atmospheric pressure.
Then, Lange suggests, since the fact that the internal pressure is greater than
the external pressure is grounded in—i.e. metaphysically explained by—the
with the DN model was its inability to account for this sort of explanatory asymmetry.)
Second, we might just as well have considered the law explaining the regularity as a whole,
but for simplicity I have focused on the explanation of the particular event e that is a part of
that regularity.
4Of course, this regularity will typically have to exhibit additional characteristics in order
to count as a law. For example, according to the BSA, it must be part of a systematization
of all the particular matters of fact that best balances simplicity and strength.
5That is not to say that all cases of self-explanation are unacceptable. Perhaps in some
outre´ time travel scenarios, for example, we would have to admit that self-explanation can
occur. But surely we should not allow that self-explanation is ubiquitous, as it would appear
to be on the Humean view. After all, our choice of the Lorentz force law, and the event e, was
relatively arbitrary. The same considerations would hold no matter which law we chose, and
no matter which instance we picked. (Lange [2018, p. 1338] also allows that the prohibition
on self-explanation may be violated in some exotic cases.)
6Lange actually frames his principle in terms of grounding rather than metaphysical ex-
planation, but it makes the connection with Loewer’s argument most explicit if we frame it
in terms of metaphysical explanation.
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particular values of both the internal and external pressures, it follows by the
transitivity principle that the particular values of those pressures help to explain
why the balloon expands. And this seems correct.
So the basic thought is that if Z metaphysically explains X, then Z provides
the metaphysical basis for X, so Z should have all of the explanatory power that
X does. Thus, Z should be able to scientifically explain anything that X can
scientifically explain. Now if TP is true, then Loewer’s gambit is no longer going
to work. To see this, consider our example with the Lorentz force law explaining
event e, which was supposed to be a generic type of scientific explanation. In
the above explication of TP, plug in the Lorentz force law for X, event e for
Y , and event e again for Z. Thus we have the Lorentz force law scientifically
explaining event e, and event e helping to metaphysically explain the Lorentz
force law. So it follows by TP that event e helps to scientifically explain event
e. Again we are left with a worrisome case of self-explanation.
Of course, it is open to the Humean to just reject TP, but doing so without
independent motivation would be objectionably ad hoc. In that vein, several
philosophers, such as Hicks and van Elswyk (2015), Miller (2015), and Marshall
(2015), have recently argued against TP on various grounds. For example,
it has been suggested that TP has unacceptable consequences in cases where
macrolevel phenomena are multiply realizable, and also that it fails to account
for the fact that a variety of different types of relations can underwrite scientific
explanations. Unfortunately for the Humean, Lange (2018) offers compelling
responses to all of these objections. Part of his response involves modifying TP
slightly to allow for contrastive effects in the explanans and explanandum, but
otherwise the principle survives largely intact.
In the rest of this paper, I am going to argue that the Humean has compelling
independent motivations for rejecting TP or any of its potential modifications.
Indeed, I will argue that the Humean has good reason to think that there
are no systematic connections whatsoever between scientific and metaphysical
explanation. To see this, we first have to review some recent developments in
the Humean tradition.
3 LOPP-style Humeanism and the Best Predic-
tive System Account of Laws
Some of the most promising Humean theories on the market right now are de-
velopments of Lewis’s BSA. The particular theories I have in mind are Hicks’s
(2017) “Epistemic Role Account,” Dorst’s (2018) “Best Predictive System Ac-
count,” and Jaag and Loew’s (forthcoming) “Cognitive Usefulness Account.”7
All three of these theories can be viewed as starting from the concept of a “Lim-
ited Oracular Perfect Physicist,” an idea that traces back to Hall (ms). There,
7Another noteworthy development of the BSA is the “Better Best System Account” of
Cohen and Callender (2009). The developments I am focusing on here are, I think, largely
compatible with the Better Best System view, though they focus on different aspects of the
Humean metaphysics.
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Hall suggests that we think of the BSA as a sort of ideal observer view of laws:
[L]et us imagine someone whom I will call a Limited Oracular Perfect
Physicist. What makes our LOPP a perfect physicist is that, given
as evidence any information about the world, she is perfectly able to
judge what hypotheses about the fundamental physical laws are most
strongly supported by that evidence. What makes her oracular is
that she has, as evidence, quite a lot of information about the world.
But not, of course, all information: else her job would be too easy.
(For example, she doesn’t directly receive as evidence information
about what the fundamental laws are.) Specifically, we will suppose
that what she has available to her as evidence are all the [particular
matters of fact] [. . . ] The [. . . ] idea, then, is roughly that the laws
are whatever she says they are. (Hall [ms], p. 15)
So the suggestion is that the laws are the result of applying a certain operation to
the totality of the particular matters of fact, namely, that operation (whichever
one it is) that physicists themselves apply when they are investigating the laws.
Theories in this tradition are variants of what I call “LOPP-style Humeanism”.8
Another way of thinking about LOPP-style Humeanism is that it elevates
the epistemic standards used by physicists in discovering the laws to the status
of constitutive standards that are part of what it is to be a law. And one
reason that this is a particularly attractive maneuver is that it immediately
presents us with an explanation of why those standards are reliable guides to
the laws. In other words, LOPP-style Humeanism reverse engineers the laws
from physicists’ epistemic standards for lawhood, thereby obviating the need to
provide an independent justification for the reliability of those standards.
By doing this, we replace one justificatory task with another. Whereas be-
fore we wanted to know why physicists’ epistemic standards were a reliable
guide to the laws, now what we should want to know is why creatures like us
would care about implementing those standards in the first place. To see what
I mean, it will help to have a more concrete proposal for these epistemic stan-
dards in mind. Thus consider Lewis’s BSA. If Lewis was right, those standards
would consist of a balance of simplicity and strength. Now one question that
inevitably arises in these sorts of context—i.e. whenever simplicity is treated as
a guide to theory choice—is why simplicity should track the truth. The uncom-
fortable answer here is that, while philosophers have long searched for epistemic
justifications for an appeal to simplicity, success has been hard to come by. It
is just not particularly clear why simplicity should be truth-conducive. But if
simplicity is rightly understood, not just as an epistemic guide to lawhood, but
as a constitutive standard of lawhood, then the question of why simplicity is a
reliable guide to truths about the laws lapses: if simplicity is part of what makes
something a law, then it becomes much clearer why it is a good idea to use sim-
plicity as part of our epistemic guide to the laws. The question then becomes
8Versions of LOPP-style Humeanism are also developed in Miller (2014) and Bhogal and
Perry (2017).
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why creatures like us should be interested in a set of principles that is partly
distinguished based on its simplicity. Our justificatory task has thus switched
from an epistemic one—making sense of why these standards are a reliable guide
to the laws—to a pragmatic one: making sense of why these standards produce
a set of principles that is useful to creatures like us.
The answer to this latter question is going to depend on which standards
scientists actually use to investigate the laws, and particularly on what sorts of
principles the combination of those standards tends to produce. If Lewis was
right, those standards are meant to produce a set of principles that constitutes
an efficient summary of the totality of the particular matters of fact.9 But
as Hicks (2017), Dorst (2018), and Jaag and Loew (forthcoming) all argue, an
efficient summary of the particular matters of fact is not likely to be particularly
useful to creatures like us. For example, an efficient summary may end up giving
us a lot of statistical facts, such as facts about the average lifespan of stars in
this universe, or facts about the standard deviation of galaxy diameters. Facts
like this, interesting though they are, are not particularly useful for predictive
purposes, nor do they resemble the dynamical form of actual putative laws in
scientific practice.10
With these points in mind, the theories advanced by Hicks, Dorst, and Jaag
and Loew can all be seen as proposing standards that differ from Lewis’s balance
of simplicity and strength, with the goal of producing principles that (i) are more
useful to creatures like us, and (ii) exhibit the general form of putative laws
that we find in scientific practice. It will prove useful for our later discussion
to examine these views in a bit more detail. Here I will focus on Dorst’s Best
Predictive System Account (“BPSA”) for ease of exposition.
The BPSA maintains that the laws are the regularities of the systematization
of the totality of the particular matters of fact which is maximally predictively
useful to creatures like us. Thus, the standards that figure into the account
are designed to produce a set of predictively useful principles. The goal then
becomes to characterize the features that would be possessed by such principles.
And the rough idea is that predictively useful principles would give us a great
deal of information about the temporal evolution of quasi-enclosed subsystems
of the universe, without relying on facts that creatures like us are usually not
in a position to ascertain. Consequently, the standards that figure into the
BPSA include straightforward desiderata like extensive dynamical implications
and wide applicability, and the predictive utility of these desiderata is straight-
forward. But the BPSA also includes desiderata such as spatial and temporal
locality, because creatures like us tend not to be able to ascertain facts that
are radically far-removed in space and time from the systems we are trying to
make predictions about. Similarly, the BPSA also includes desiderata regarding
spatial, temporal, and rotational symmetries. The thought here is that since
creatures like us are not innately able to locate and orient ourselves in space and
time, principles that are predictively useful to us would not require that sort
9For explication of this point, see, e.g., Lange (2009, pp. 101-102), Albert (2015, pp.
23-24), and Beebee (2000, p. 574).
10C.f. Dorst (2018) for a more comprehensive discussion of this point.
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of information in order to be applied. The fact that these various features are
reflected in the principles that physicists (past and present) have regarded as
laws suggests both that these desiderata are indeed part of physicists’ epistemic
criteria for lawhood, and also more generally that we are on the right track in
thinking about the laws in terms of predictive utility.
In sum, when physicists theorize about the laws, they implement a variety
of different standards. The BPSA makes sense of this fact by suggesting that
these standards are constitutive of lawhood and that they all serve the common
purpose of maximizing the predictive utility of the resulting set of principles.
Thus, while the standards are truth-conducive, it can be misleading to think
that their fundamental purpose is to serve as a guide to truths about the laws.
Rather, the fundamental purpose of implementing these standards is to produce
a system of laws that is maximally predictively useful, and whose truth is, in
a sense, derivative upon that predictive utility. The best predictive systemati-
zation of the particular matters of fact constitutes the truth about the laws of
nature, and it does so because it is the best such systematization.
Theories like the BPSA constitute some of the most promising recent devel-
opments in the Humean tradition. In the next section, I am going to consider
how a Humean sympathetic with the BPSA should conceive of the aim of expla-
nation in science. In particular, I am going to consider the following question:
Why do scientists care whether their theories possess explanatory virtues?
4 Why Care about Explanatory Virtues?
Why do we care about explanatory considerations when we do science? What is
it about explanations, and explanatory theories, that makes them scientifically
valuable? One answer is just that explanations are intrinsically valuable: they
are intellectual achievements that have value much like any other intellectual
achievement. Strevens (2008) suggests just this sort of explanation of the value
of explanation:
If science provides anything of intrinsic value, it is explanation. Pre-
diction and control are useful, and success in any endeavor is grati-
fying, but when science is pursued as an end rather than as a means,
it is for the sake of understanding—the moment when a small, tem-
porary being reaches out to touch the universe and makes contact.
(2008, p. 3)
Strevens thus views explanations as valuable in their own right. By contrast,
other philosophers have argued that the value of explanation lies in its con-
nection to practical concerns such as prediction. Hempel and Oppenheim, for
example, famously suggested as much:
It is this potential predictive force which gives scientific explanation
its importance: only to the extent that we are able to explain empiri-
cal facts can we attain the major objective of scientific research. . . to
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anticipate new occurrences and to control, at least to some extent,
the changes in our environment. (1948, p. 138)
Similarly, Quine and Ullian maintain that “the hypotheses we seek in explana-
tion of past observations serve again in the prediction of future ones. Curiosity
thus has survival value, despite having killed a cat” (1970).
Part of the trouble that arises in trying to answer the question of why sci-
entists care about explanations is that the question itself is ambiguous. On one
reading, the question is asking why scientists in fact find explanations valuable,
whereas on another reading, the question is asking why is it prudent for scien-
tists to care about explanatory considerations. On the first reading, an answer
along the lines of Strevens’s is undoubtedly often right: individual scientists of-
ten find intrinsic value in explanatory considerations simply because they have
been trained to find them valuable, elegant, etc. But on the second reading, it
is not so clear that Strevens’s answer is particularly helpful. If I want to know
why it is prudent for us to care about explanatory considerations, replying that
explanations are inherently valuable is not especially elucidating.
It is this second reading of the question that I am concerned with here.
I am going to argue that the Humean should answer this question by follow-
ing Hempel and Oppenheim’s original suggestion, and thinking of explanatory
considerations as derivative upon predictive considerations. Of course, Hempel
and Oppenheim’s symmetry thesis—that every explanation is a potential pre-
diction and vice versa—no longer appears tenable. But that doesn’t preclude
the possibility that there is some less direct connection between explanation
and prediction. To see this connection, I propose to come at the issue from the
side, as it were, by asking why scientists care about their theories possessing
explanatory virtues. If we can figure out what is valuable about the explanatory
virtues, then we will have the beginnings of an answer to why it is prudent for
scientists to value explanatory considerations in general.
Of course, any exploration of the value of the explanatory virtues has to
begin with a discussion about what sorts of theoretical virtues count as ex-
planatory virtues. Unfortunately there is no widespread agreement on either
the terminology used to name these virtues, nor on the exact list of theoretical
virtues that are rightly counted as explanatory. Nevertheless, there are a few
virtues that appear most commonly (under some guise or other) in discussions
of explanatory virtues. Here I will consider four of the most prominent ones.
First, simplicity. Many theorists have suggested that theories that possess a
greater degree of simplicity have greater explanatory power.11 However, there
are multiple virtues that go by the same name here. One, which I’ll call “con-
ceptual simplicity,” concerns the nature of the theoretical apparatus appealed
to as an explanation. Theories that make use of a more straightforward con-
ceptual framework than others possess the virtue of conceptual simplicity to
a greater degree. For example, the picture of ideal gases as a collection of
non-interacting point particles possesses a considerable degree of conceptual
11Simplicity is discussed as an explanatory virtue by philosophers such as Kuhn (1977),
Quine and Ullian (1970), Thagard (1978), Psillos (2002), and Lipton (2004).
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simplicity, and would be preferable on these grounds, other things being equal,
to a theory with more abstruse theoretical postulates that nevertheless has the
same observable consequences.
Another type of simplicity is what I’ll call “extrapolative simplicity.” Extrap-
olative simplicity concerns the fitting of curves (i.e. theories) to data points.
Simpler curves are expressible by equations of lower degree, and such curves
possess more extrapolative simplicity than curves that must be expressed using
higher degree equations. Here again, other things being equal, theories with
more extrapolative simplicity are preferable to theories with less.
Another virtue that is commonly characterized as explanatory is unificatory
power. A theory possesses more unificatory power if it is applicable, in a uniform
manner, to phenomena in very different domains.12 A classic example here is
Newton’s theory of gravity, which was able to treat the movements of earthly
bodies and the planets in a unified manner, thus constituting a significant im-
provement over the heterogeneous conjunction of Galileo’s law of falling bodies
and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion.
Finally, another theoretical virtue often counted as explanatory is precision.
The virtue of precision amounts to the fact that if a theory T1 gives more details
about a given phenomenon than its rivals T2, T3, etc., then, other things being
equal, T1 is preferable, as an explanation of that phenomenon, to T2, T3, etc.
13
These details can take a variety of forms, but the rough thought is that the more
information a theory provides about either the production of the phenomenon
of interest, or about various aspects of the phenomenon itself, the more that
theory possesses the virtue of precision.
There are, of course, additional explanatory virtues often cited in the liter-
ature, but the four I have mentioned here—conceptual simplicity, extrapolative
simplicity, unificatory power, and precision—are some of the most common.
What, then, is the value of these virtues? One place that this question gets
addressed head-on is in discussions about the status of inference to the best
explanation (“IBE”) in science, particularly in the debates about whether IBE
is compatible with Bayesianism. It will be worth briefly reviewing some of these
debates here. Supporters of IBE maintain that we should believe the theory
that scores the best in terms of its explanatory virtues.14 Thus a theory T1
receives a higher credence than theories T2, T3, etc. just in case T1 exhibits
the explanatory virtues to a higher degree than T2, T3, etc. The suggestion,
then, seems to be that the explanatory virtues are truth-conducive: theories
that exhibit these virtues to greater degrees are more likely to be true.
A number of theorists have attempted to argue that explanatory consider-
ations, such as the virtues we have just considered, are truth-conducive. Thus,
12Virtues corresponding to unificatory power go by a variety of names, including “gen-
erality” (Quine and Ullian, 1970), “consilience” (Thagard, 1978), and “unification” (Psillos,
2002).
13Precision is discussed as an explanatory virtue by Psillos (2002), Lipton (2004), and
Cabrera (2017), among others.
14Philosophical discussions of IBE trace back at least to Harman (1965). Lipton (2004)
gives probably the most extensive contemporary treatment.
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Henderson (2014) develops a view that she calls “emergent compatibilism,” ar-
guing that IBE essentially “emerges” from the framework of Bayesianism. As
Henderson puts it, “a Bayesian who adopts constraints on her probabilities,
which are reasonable on her own terms, would end up favoring more explana-
tory theories” (2014, p. 12). And since Bayesianism is concerned solely with
the confirmation of hypotheses (and not other other sorts of pragmatic or in-
strumental goals), Henderson’s suggestion that explanatory virtues emerge from
Bayesian confirmational considerations implies that the explanatory virtues are
confirmationally relevant, i.e. truth-conducive.
Similarly, both Lipton (2004) and Dellse´n (2017) argue that IBE should
be conceived as a heuristic that approximates probabilistic Bayesian reasoning
for cognitively limited creatures. The rough thought is that it is easier for
creatures like us to make rough-and-ready judgments about the degree to which
hypotheses possess explanatory virtues than it is for us to go through detailed
probabilistic reasoning in accord with Bayes’ theorem, but ultimately these are
just two different methods for helping us track the epistemic probabilities of the
relevant hypotheses.15 Lipton and Dellse´n thus also conceive of the explanatory
virtues as fundamentally truth-conducive.
By contrast, a number of other theorists have argued that IBE is incom-
patible with Bayesianism because at least some of the explanatory virtues do
not track the truth, and therefore are not confirmationally relevant. The most
famous such criticism is mounted by van Fraassen (1989), who argues that IBE
would require agents to assign higher probabilities to more explanatory hy-
potheses than is required by the Bayesian framework. This sort of criticism is
most common regarding the explanatory virtue of simplicity. For example, con-
sider the following remark by Fumerton, which is characteristic of the general
skepticism of the truth-conduciveness of simplicity:
[A simpler theory] is certainly more desirable than its competitors in
the sense that it would be nice if it turned out to be true. But this
not being the best of all possible worlds (some theologians aside)
what would be nice is not always so. (1980, p. 596)
These sorts of worries about the truth-conduciveness of simplicity would seem
to apply to both the conceptual and extrapolative variants, although many
theorists are not always explicit about the distinction. In the case of conceptual
simplicity, the worry is that it is unclear why we are justified in expecting nature
to be describable in conceptually simple terms. After all, why couldn’t nature
just be massively complex? And in the case of extrapolative simplicity, the
worry is the familiar one of curve fitting: given that there are an infinity of
curves that fit the observed data, on what basis do we justify a preference for
simpler curves?
Similar sorts of worries sometimes arise about the other explanatory virtues.
For example, Cabrera (2017) argues that the virtue of precision cannot be ap-
propriately conceived as truth-conducive, for the simple fact that a more precise
15It is worth clarifying that Dellse´n thinks IBE only functions as a guide to comparative,
not absolute, probability values.
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hypothesis provides more information, and thus is less likely to be true, on prob-
abilistic grounds, than a less precise hypothesis. In the most extreme case, we
could compare the probabilities of two hypotheses H1 and H2, where H2 is
strictly a precisification of H1. Thus we would have H2 |= H1 but H1 6|= H2,
and therefore P (H1) ≥ P (H2). For example, suppose I am trying to find an
explanation for the fact that the grass on my lawn is wet. I entertain two
hypotheses:
H1: It rained last night.
H2: It rained for exactly 3 hours, 27 minutes, and 14 seconds last night.
While both hypotheses would explain the fact that the grass is wet, H2 contains
strictly more information than H1, so even though H2 possesses a greater degree
of precision, it is also less likely to be true.16
There are, then, significant debates about how to understand the value of
many of the explanatory virtues in science, and currently there is no clear con-
sensus on the right approach. Now the pertinent question for our purposes is
this: How should the Humean seek to understand them?
The basic suggestion here is that the Humean should pull the same maneu-
ver that she does in the case of laws, and attempt to reverse engineer the truth
of our scientific theories from the epistemic standards used to decide among
them. Thus, the Humean should conceive of the explanatory virtues not merely
as epistemic guides to the correct theory, but as partly constitutive of the truth
of the correct theory. In other words, the Humean should conceive of the ex-
planatory virtues using the framework of the Best Systems approach: the true
theory is the one that best satisfies the various explanatory virtues, and that
theory is true because it best satisfies those virtues.
Conceiving of the explanatory virtues in this way comes with an immediate
payoff, but it also gives rise to a novel challenge. The payoff is that we no
longer require an account of why the explanatory virtues are truth-conducive,
for if their satisfaction is just part of what makes the true theory true, then their
epistemic justification is trivial. We thereby avoid all the worries about whether,
and why, virtues like simplicity, precision, and unification should be expected
to track the truth. Instead we are faced with a different challenge: accounting
for why creatures like us would care about finding a theory that best satisfies
16One might worry that a comparison of H1 and H2 on explanatory grounds is illegitimate
because one entails the other. In this vein, Dellse´n (2016) argues that the hypotheses used
in any particular application of IBE ought to be incompatible. But even if that is correct,
precision can hardly be regarded as truth-conducive. Imagine comparing H1 with H3: My
neighbor’s sprinkler system sprayed my yard last night for exactly 3 hours, 27 minutes, and
14 seconds. As explanations of the wetness of the lawn, H1 and H3 are incompatible, but the
increased precision of H3 drags down its probability.
On the other hand, maybe the suggestion is that rival hypotheses in an application of IBE
must be, in some sense, “complete” explanations, in that they have to be both incompatible
and equally precise. (Indeed, this seems closer in spirit to Dellse´n’s own suggestion.) In that
case, it is hard to see how precision could still be an explanatory virtue, since all hypotheses
compared in any application of IBE will be equally precise.
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these virtues. Just as with LOPP-style Humeanism, then, the challenge shifts
from providing an epistemic justification to a pragmatic one.
The most natural way for the BPSA-friendly Humean to provide such a
pragmatic justification is to seek to understand the explanatory virtues as con-
tributing to the predictive utility of the resulting theory, much like she conceives
of the standards of lawhood as being designed to produce a collection of pre-
dictively useful principles. The Humean thus follows the likes of Hempel and
Quine in suggesting that explanatory considerations have predictive value. Of
course, where the rubber meets the road is in the attempt to explain how each
of the explanatory virtues itself contributes to the predictive utility of the re-
sulting theory. To be sure, this is no small task, but I think there are reasons
for optimism. For example, here is how the Humean could try to argue that the
four explanatory virtues mentioned above are helpful for predictive purposes:
1) Conceptual Simplicity: Consider two theories, T1 and T2, which are
empirically equivalent (as far as we know), yet T1 is conceptually much
simpler than T2. Why, in that case, is T1 more useful for predictive pur-
poses?
There are at least two reasons. First, theories that are conceptually sim-
pler are easier to use to make rough-and-ready predictions. For example,
consider someone unfamiliar with the macroscopic behaviors of gases, who
only knows the simple postulates of the molecular theory of gases. Even to
someone in such a position, it should not be surprising that heating a con-
tainer of gas will increase the pressure inside the container. For it is not too
difficult to reason that heating the gas will make the constituent molecules
move faster, therefore causing more forceful and frequent collisions with
the walls of the container. Of course, none of this is knowable a priori,
but it does accord with our intuitive expectations. On the other hand, a
theory with more abstruse theoretical postulates (that nevertheless makes
the same predictions as the molecular theory of gases) is unlikely to lend
itself to such easy predictions. In other words, it is not as easy to use a
more complicated theory to get a rough idea of how the system of interest
is going to behave.
Second, conceptually simpler theories are more predictively useful because
they lend themselves to more straightforward modifications when con-
fronted with recalcitrant evidence. Suppose a given theory makes some
incorrect predictions, and we therefore decide that we are going to have
to modify the theory. This task can be immensely easier if it is a simpler
theory that is easy for us to grasp and manipulate. Since we are more eas-
ily able to understand how the constituent elements of a simpler theory
combine to produce the various predictions, we are in a better position to
know which elements might have to be changed when the predictions are
not borne out by the evidence.
2) Extrapolative Simplicity: How could predictive concerns underwrite a
preference for theories with a greater degree of extrapolative simplicity?
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One of the more prominent justifications of simplicity considerations in
the context of curve fitting is found in the literature on the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC). The goal of this criterion is to select a curve that
minimizes the chances of fitting “noise” in the observational data. There
are some technical discussions of the AIC in the literature (see, e.g., Sober
and Forster (1994) and Kieseppa¨ (1997)), but we need only the general
idea here. The thought is that whenever we gather observational data
(say, of the relationship between two variables x and y), our results are
the product of two factors: the true underlying relationship between those
variables, and observational “errors” or “noise.” Thus if we select a curve
that fits the data too exactly, it will be weighing the noise more than the
true relationship, and therefore it is likely to lead to incorrect predictions.
So the rationale for selecting a simpler curve is that it is likely to be more
predictively accurate. As Woodward (2014) puts it:
The simplicity term does not enter into the formula for AIC
because simplicity is being accorded some intrinsic value...but
rather because the goal of maximizing expected predictive ac-
curacy in itself requires inclusion of this term. In other words,
the justification for the simplicity term is entirely in terms of
the fact that it is a means to the goal of predictive accuracy. (p.
116)
This, to me, sounds like exactly the kind of pragmatic justification of
extrapolative simplicity that the Humean is looking for.
3) Unificatory Power: Why are theories with more unificatory power more
predictively useful? Why, for example, was the Newtonian theory of grav-
ity preferable on predictive grounds to the heterogeneous conjunction of
Galileo’s law of falling bodies and Kepler’s laws of planetary motion? Re-
member that theories with more unificatory power are able to account
for disparate phenomena using the same theoretical framework; Newton’s
theory of gravity uses the law of universal gravitation to account for the
behaviors of both earthly and heavenly bodies. By contrast, the theo-
retical frameworks of Galileo’s law of falling bodies and Kepler’s laws of
planetary motion are quite different from each other. The key, then, is
to consider how these theories would account for the behaviors of objects
that fall on the border of both subdomains. For example, how would the
conjunction of Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws treat a projectile that starts in
outer space and then gradually falls to earth, such as a comet or meteor?
There is no clear direction from this heterogeneous theory about how to
treat such phenomena: do we use Kepler’s laws, or Galileo’s laws, or some
mixture of them? But Newton’s theory is unambiguous in its instructions:
apply the law of universal gravitation, just like you would for any other
object. The thought, then, is that theories with more unificatory power
are more useful for predictive purposes because they give unambiguous
instructions for generating predictions about objects lying on the borders
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of multiple subdomains of the theory. Radically disjunctive theories, on
the other hand, will be correspondingly more equivocal about how one
should treat objects at the intersections of their various subdomains.17
4) Precision: Why are theories that provide more information about the
phenomenon of interest—either about the factors leading to its produc-
tion or about the phenomenon itself—more predictively useful? This ques-
tion almost answers itself. If I tasked you with making predictions about
some novel physical system that you had never seen before, clearly you
would prefer a theory that gives you more information about the system in
question. This is roughly like the difference between being told (a) “The
system will do something in the future,” and (b) “The system will evolve
in exactly this way...”. Clearly if your concern is with making predictions,
a theory with more precision is better, other things being equal.
Conceiving of the explanatory virtues as methods of designing a theory with
higher predictive utility thus looks to be a promising strategy. Of course, there
are a number of other explanatory virtues that I have not mentioned here.
Cabrera (2017) alone mentions the additional virtues of scope, mechanism, fit
with background data, and empirical adequacy, none of which I have discussed.
To be sure, then, the Humean would have additional work to do in trying to
explain how all of these explanatory virtues could be construed as conducive
to predictive utility. But the key point is that everyone has their work cut out
for them here. After all, we have already seen that the project of conceiving of
the explanatory virtues as truth-conducive encounters a number of significant
obstacles. And it is by no means obvious that the project of conceiving of these
virtues as prediction-conducive is any worse off. Indeed, the plausibility of the
above suggestions about the predictive value of simplicity, unificatory power,
etc. indicates that we may actually have an easier time thinking of the virtues
in this manner.
In sum, our original question was this: Why do scientists care that their
theories exhibit explanatory virtues? The answer I am suggesting on behalf of
the Humean is that explanatory virtues are valuable because they contribute
to the predictive utility of the resulting theory. This is consonant with some
promising recent developments in the Humean tradition, which develop an un-
derstanding of laws primarily in terms of their predictive utility. It is also
important to note that this suggestion is perfectly compatible with the thought
17van Fraassen (1980, p. 86) gives a similar explanation of the value of unification, suggest-
ing that the aim of empirical adequacy requires our theories to be able to cover phenomena
on the borders of their subdomains.
Additionally, the current state of fundamental physics may provide support for this predic-
tive conception of the value of unification. Specifically, there are radically different physical
theories governing Planck-scale and high energy regimes, and these theories seem to generate
incompatible predictions about events in the early universe. The search for a grand unified
theory may then be viewed as arising, not out of a mere preference for the aesthetic value
of unification, but out of the desire to have a theory that accurately predicts the behavior of
events in domains where our current theories generate incompatible predictions. Thanks to
an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
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that the explanatory virtues are truth-conducive, though it does require that
they be conceived as not primarily truth-conducive. Rather, they are primarily
prediction-conducive, and they track the truth, on the Humean picture, only
because the true theory just is the one that exhibits the greatest predictive
utility.18
5 Explanation in Science and Metaphysics
The Humean picture of explanation that I have just been sketching is in broad
agreement with a conception of the aims of science that has recently fallen into
disrepute. In the early twentieth century, positivistically-minded philosophers of
science tended to regard explanation with suspicion. As Salmon (1999) puts it,
they were inclined to view explanation as “beyond the scope of science, in such
realms as metaphysics and theology” (1999, 338). Karl Pearson, for example,
put it bluntly: “Nobody now believes that science explains anything” (1911,
xi, emphasis in original). In lieu of explanation, these philosophers tended to
emphasize the predictive aims of science. This can be observed even in the
writings of Hempel and Oppenheim, who, as we have already seen, claimed
that the importance of scientific explanation lay in its connection to prediction
in their seminal 1948 paper “Studies in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.”
Oddly enough, it was that very paper which seems to have engendered a shift in
perspective, encouraging many philosophers not only to believe that there are
such things as scientific explanations, but also to view them as an independent
goal in their own right.19 For example, fifteen years after that paper, Nicholas
Rescher wrote:
It is a mistake to think of the definitive task of science as being the
specific prediction of the future states of natural systems. It would
be more appropriate to construe the root of science in terms rather
of explanation than of prediction. (1963, p. 343)
Nowadays when philosophers discuss the aims of science, they tend to mention
both prediction and explanation, but as Douglas (2009, pp. 444-445) laments,
the overwhelming majority of the discussion focuses on the latter.
18It is worth noting that, in principle, the Humean has another option open to her: she
can view the explanatory virtues as only conducive to predictive utility, and not thereby also
truth-conducive. On this picture, IBE is inherently concerned with fashioning theories that
are predictively useful to us, without any regard to whether or not they are true.
While it is open to the Humean to adopt this conception of the explanatory virtues, I do not
think it comports well with the overall Humean picture. For example, according to the BPSA,
the Humean views the standards of lawhood as truth-conducive because they are constitutive
of lawhood. She does not say that these standards help produce principles that are predictively
useful to us, though they are not a guide to the truths about the laws. (Indeed, this latter
view begins to sound rather anti-Humean.) So it seems to me that if the Humean wants to
be consistent in the way she treats both (i) our epistemic standards for lawhood, and (ii) the
explanatory virtues, she should view them both as fundamentally prediction-conducive, and
as derivatively truth-conducive. (Thanks to Marc Lange and an anonymous referee for raising
this point.)
19For discussion of this shift in perspective, see, e.g., Salmon (1999) and Douglas (2009).
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My suggestion, then, is that the Humean should agree with Douglas in think-
ing that the pendulum has swung too far away from prediction. On the Humean
picture I have been sketching, prediction is the fundamental aim of science: the
fundamental point of engaging in the scientific enterprise is to allow us to make
more accurate, more reliable predictions about the behaviors of systems in our
environment. Of course, that is not to say that prediction is the only aim of
science. It’s just that the other aims are derivative upon predictive aims. For
example, scientists of course care about explanation—contra Pearson, nobody
now believes that science doesn’t explain anything—but the ultimate scientific
value of explanatory considerations, on this picture, is instrumental: they are
ways of producing theories of greater predictive utility.
There is a clear benefit to conceiving of the aims of science in this way,
namely, we thereby provide a coherent rationale for our society’s investment in
science. As a species, we devote a great deal of time and money to the scientific
enterprise. For example, the discovery of the Higgs boson is estimated to have
cost over $13 billion, and was the culmination of many years of research by
thousands of people (Knapp, 2012). Why, you might wonder, do we care so
much about doing science?
If the fundamental aim of science is explanation, then we immediately run
into another question: Why ask “Why?”? (Salmon, 1979). This question,
which Prescott-Couch (2017) calls the “Why Care? Question,” is not so easy to
answer, at least not without appealing to more straightforward practical con-
cerns. Prescott-Couch’s point is that even if we were to come up with necessary
and sufficient conditions for something to count as a scientific explanation, we
would still face the further question of why creatures like us should care about
that sort of thing. Of course, one reason we might care about having scientific
explanations is that they are particularly insightful or intellectually satisfying.
But mere intellectual curiosity, powerful as it is to some of us, cannot account
for why our society as a whole is willing to invest so much time, money, and
energy into scientific endeavors.20 For example, it is simply not plausible that
the search for the Higgs boson was motivated primarily by intellectual curiosity.
By contrast, if the fundamental aim of science is prediction, then we have
a straightforward answer to why we care so much about doing science. And
this is because the analogous “Why Care? Question” for prediction is easy to
answer. Why should we care about being able to make accurate predictions in
the first place? Because predictive capabilities are helpful for planning actions
and controlling aspects of our environments. Prediction is straightforwardly
useful in a way that explanation is not. Consequently, conceiving of science as
fundamentally aimed at prediction allows us to give a satisfying account of why
society as a whole—not just the intellectually curious among us—is willing to
invest so much in scientific endeavors.
So the Humean should conceive of science as fundamentally aimed at in-
creasing our predictive capacities. Explanation, on this view, is a derivative
20This point should be especially salient to philosophers, of all people. Would that philos-
ophy commanded the massive societal investment that something like physics does.
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aim of science, and the purpose of seeking scientific explanations is to increase
the predictive utility of our scientific theories. Now let us return to the ques-
tion of §2: Are scientific and metaphysical explanations linked by a transitivity
principle (TP)? If so, we have seen that it spells trouble for the Humean. The
difference now is that the Humean has a specific conception of the aims of scien-
tific explanation in hand, and we have seen how this aim can inform the virtues
that scientists regard as explanatory. And so the question of whether, and to
what extent, scientific and metaphysical explanations line up (so as to possibly
make TP true) is manifestly going to depend on whether, and to what extent,
their aims line up. Thus, to evaluate the plausibility of a connection between
scientific and metaphysical explanations, we are also going to have to consider
the aim of explanation in metaphysics.
Of course, there are a variety of different conceptions of metaphysics and
metaphysical explanations. Philosophers of different persuasions have suggested
that metaphysical explanation aims at diverse tasks ranging from limning the
fundamental structure of reality to investigating the nature of our own concepts.
I am not going to propose a specific conception of the fundamental aim of
metaphysics here, and I do not think the Humean needs to have such a proposal
in order to rebut the circularity worries. The reason is that everyone, Humeans
and anti-Humeans alike, should agree on the following: the fundamental aim of
metaphysical explanation, whatever it may be, is not to increase the predictive
utility of our metaphysical theories. Metaphysics simply does not aim primarily
at designing theories that are maximally predictively useful. That is of course
not to say that it is not helpful or beneficial when metaphysical theories make
predictions that end up coming true; accurate predictions are sometimes an
indication that a metaphysical theory is on the right track. But it is to say that
our fundamental aim in metaphysics is not—and never has been—to use our
theories for predictive purposes. Indeed, if this were our fundamental aim, then
we really ought to be alarmed by our results, since metaphysical theories tend
not to be particularly useful for predictive purposes. Imagine trying to use the
BSA, for example, to make predictions about how a system of particles is going
to behave. This would be a hopeless endeavor.
So according to the Humean, the aims of explanation in science and meta-
physics must be quite different. Scientific explanation aims primarily at pre-
dictive utility, but this cannot be the aim of metaphysical explanation. Conse-
quently, we should expect to find differences in the explanatory virtues appealed
to in science and metaphysics. We should expect, that is, to find different virtues
in each field, or to find that similar virtues are implemented differently, or that
they are balanced differently. For example, no one should be tempted to imple-
ment the AIC conception of extrapolative simplicity in designing a metaphysical
theory. Of course, this is not to say that simplicity is not an explanatory virtue
in metaphysics—it clearly is. But its justification as a virtue, and the way it is
used to shape our metaphysical theories, must be different than it is in science.
Similarly, while both metaphysicians and scientists tend to prefer theories
with greater unificatory power, if the Humean is right then the justification
for this preference in each case must be different. Scientific theories with more
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unificatory power are preferable because they are better able to predict phe-
nomena falling in the intersection of various subdomains of the theory. Notice,
though, that this justification of unificatory power is somewhat defeasible: if
there is good reason to think that there never are phenomena that fall in the
intersection of the theory’s subdomains, then the preference for theories with
greater unificatory power could in principle be overridden by other explanatory
virtues. But it is not clear that this could likewise happen in metaphysics, where
pointing out that a theory is radically disjunctive tends to be viewed as a more
damning criticism.21
If the explanatory virtues are different in metaphysics than in science, then
there is no reason to think that there are any systematic connections between
the explanations of metaphysics and the explanations of science. In particular,
there is no reason to think that Lange’s transitivity principle holds. Of course,
this does not preclude the possibility that the explanations of science and meta-
physics may sometimes align so that we can chain them together in the manner
of TP. Indeed, this may account for the plausibility of some of the examples
that Lange uses to motivate TP (more on this in a minute). But on the picture
I am suggesting, we should not expect to find that TP holds in general. And
in particular, we should not expect that it holds in the case of laws explaining
their instances. Yes, according to the Humean, the particular matters of fact
metaphysically explain the laws. And yes, the laws scientifically explain the
particular matters of fact. But it does not follow that the particular matters
of fact have to scientifically explain themselves. Why? Because if scientific and
metaphysical explanation have different aims, then the fact that X metaphysi-
cally explains Y should not, by itself, compel us to conclude that X scientifically
explains anything that Y does. In short, given their different aims, scientific
explanation is not beholden to metaphysical explanation in its pronouncements
about what explains what.
Furthermore, this account of scientific explanation as fundamentally aimed
at predictive utility actually gives us insight into what is bad about cases of
self-explanation. If science admitted the possibility of self-explanation, this
would completely undermine the ability of explanations to function as a guide
to predictive utility. For if every fact could be explained just by appealing to
itself, then explanatory considerations would pose no constraints whatsoever
on the resultant theory. They would be utterly useless for theory building.
And that flies in the face of the Humean’s view of scientific explanation as an
instrument used to generate theories of greater predictive utility. Therefore, the
Humean has a way, not only of avoiding the explanatory circularity worry, but
also of accounting for why explanatory circularity is something to be avoided in
the first place.
21Case in point: physicists tend not to be alarmed by the fact that textbook formulations
of quantum mechanics treat the measurement process as fundamentally different than the rest
of the dynamics. Metaphysicians, on the other hand, view this disjunctivity as unacceptable
in a fundamental theory of the world, and have long searched for resolutions to the so-called
“measurement problem.” Perhaps the difference here is explained by the different explanatory
aims of physicists and metaphysicians.
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Lastly, there remains the question of why we may have found TP plausible
in the first place. Many of the examples used to motivate TP involve a less
fundamental fact being grounded in, or metaphysically explained by, a collection
of more fundamental facts. In Lange’s example of the expanding balloon (2013,
p. 257), the internal pressure of the balloon helps to scientifically explain why
the balloon expands. And the internal pressure itself is grounded in the forces
exerted by various gas molecules colliding with the sides of the balloon. Thus,
we are supposed to conclude that those forces help to scientifically explain why
the balloon expands. This seems perfectly correct, and in accord with TP.
Furthermore, it seems likely that we could produce chains of explanation like
this in many other cases where we have a scientific reduction of one domain
to another, such as in the statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic
phenomena. What, then, is the Humean to say about the existence TP-like
chains of explanations in cases of scientific reductions?
I think the best response for the Humean is to maintain that these expla-
nations of physically less-fundamental phenomena by more fundamental phe-
nomena are, in fact, not metaphysical explanations at all, but scientific expla-
nations.22 Thus, in these examples we have chains of scientific explanations,
but no direct connection between metaphysical and scientific explanations. In
support of this position, the Humean could point out that scientific reductions,
such as the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, all have their
origins in scientific practice, not in metaphysics. And therefore it would seem
quite odd to claim, for example, that statistical mechanical explanations of ther-
modynamic phenomena are not scientific explanations. If we have to classify it
as one or the other, it would seem much more natural to classify it as a scientific
explanation than a metaphysical one.
The strongest argument in favor of viewing these sorts of physically reduc-
tive explanations as metaphysical explanations seems to be that they appeal
to more fundamental facts (i.e. the lower-level realizers) to explain less fun-
damental facts, and since metaphysics is commonly regarded as articulating
fundamentality hierarchies, they must therefore be metaphysical explanations.
But there are two points to note here. First, the conception of metaphysics as
articulating fundamentality hierarchies is not necessary—I’ve already mentioned
other possibilities for the aim of metaphysics, such as describing the structure of
our concepts. And even if the Humean adopts the fundamentality conception of
metaphysics, this still doesn’t establish that the statistical mechanical explana-
tions of thermodynamic phenomena are themselves metaphysical explanations.
For the Humean already has a need for a distinction between physical and meta-
physical fundamentality.23 To see this, just note that the Humean thinks that
the fundamental laws of physics are not themselves metaphysically fundamental.
So there is already a need for the Humean to regard metaphysical fundamentality
as essentially different from physical fundamentality. And that difference un-
dercuts the inference from the relative fundamentality of statistical mechanical
22Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response.
23C.f. Bhogal and Perry (2017), p. 87.
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phenomena to the conclusion that statistical mechanical explanations of ther-
modynamic phenomena must be metaphysical explanations. Rather, statistical
mechanics could be physically more fundamental without being metaphysically
more fundamental.
Of course, this response would require further exploration in a number of re-
spects, especially since it presupposes a distinction between physical and meta-
physical fundamentality that needs further articulation. Unfortunately, this
would take us well outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I think that
the foregoing arguments show that the Humean has every reason to doubt the
existence of a systematic connection between scientific and metaphysical expla-
nations.
6 Conclusion
In her (2012) paper on the methodology of metaphysics, Paul defends the le-
gitimacy of metaphysics as a discipline by arguing that it uses the same tools
as science. Specifically, both scientists and metaphysicians use inference to the
best explanation to guide their theorizing. Paul argues that since IBE tracks
the truth in science, we have every reason to think that it also tracks the truth
in metaphysics.
The Humean should be wary of this argument, because it assumes that
science and metaphysics have, at bottom, the same goal: discover the truth.
On the Humean picture I am suggesting here, science aims fundamentally at
prediction, and the truth of our scientific theories is a function of their predictive
utility. But metaphysics does not aim, fundamentally, at prediction, and the
truth of our metaphysical theories is not primarily a function of their predictive
utility. If the Humean is right, the different aims of science and metaphysics
should lead us to be cautious about importing the tools of one discipline for use
in the other. Tools like IBE, fine-tuned as they are for scientific purposes, are
useful for particular goals, and it is inadvisable to assume that since they are
useful for one goal, they also must be useful for another.24
Indeed, there is a concern here that applies, not just to Humeans, but to
all metaphysicians. Insofar as the aims of science and metaphysics do coincide,
we metaphysicians should feel a little uncomfortable. After all, we all ought to
be wary of one of the recurring questions of undergraduates: “Shouldn’t you
really just be doing science?” If we want to have a compelling response to that
question, then it helps to be able to suggest that metaphysicians are aiming
at something very different than scientists are. And insofar as our aims are
different, one would also expect our tools to be different. The Humean, I am
suggesting, has an understanding of science that readily lends itself to this sort
of difference in both aims and tools. What is less clear at this point is whether
anti-Humeans do also.
24Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of “tuning” IBE differently, so that we
can use it for metaphysics. My point is just that we ought not to use it indiscriminately,
without careful consideration of whether it has been adjusted for our purposes.
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